![]() Surprisingly, despite their overwhelming strength, the ability of polar powers to dictate the political outcomes of wars against small countries either that are located beyond their sphere of influence or that have geostrategic importance to their peer/s is limited and perhaps nonexistent. This was also the case in the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 ( Barber 1973) and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 ( Bischof, Karner, and Ruggenthaler 2010). This was the case in the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 ( Cole 1997) and in the US interventions in Panama in 1989 ( Yates 2008). (For the definition of polar powers, see Israeli 2019.) They can easily dictate the political outcomes of wars and conflicts fought against adversaries located either within their sphere of influence or lacking any geostrategic importance to their peer/s. Polar powers-which are the strongest great powers within a world system such that their number defines the polarity of the system-can behave aggressively by launching wars against smaller adversaries. The questions this study addresses are fundamental and illustrate one of the most challenging paradoxes of our time. H ow was it that the S oviet U nion, O ne of the two superpowers operating during the Cold War era’s bipolar system, was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan? Did the Soviets have any option other than returning to the political status quo ante at the end of the war? Should this outcome have been expected and predicted, or did it occur by mere chance or coincidence? Was this outcome a result of the distribution of capabilities between the belligerent sides, or rather a result of forces positioned beyond the combat zone?
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